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This paper investigates the impact of minimum wages on employment and wages
in Indonesian manufacturing firms between 1993 and 2006. It shows that within
firms, the employment effects of minimum wage hikes is negative. It finds significant,
negative employment effects of minimum wages among small firms and for
non-production, less-educated and female workers. The paper also finds that
minimum wages are more correlated with small firms’ average wages than large
firms’, suggesting that minimum wages are more binding in small firms.
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Most countries around the world have some forms of minimum wages. Policymakers
have often argued that rises in minimum wages lift the earnings of low-income
workers, and therefore can be used as a tool to reduce poverty and inequality. In some
situations (e.g. with monopsonistic firms), a moderate rise in minimum wages can in-
crease the earnings of low-income workers without causing job losses. Some also argue
that wage increases can improve workers’ productivity (Levine, 1992; Raff and
Summers, 1987) because they lead to increases in work effort, reductions in job turn-
over and more on-the-job training (Katz, 1987). However, some empirical findings
have shown that higher minimum wages lead to lower employment.
Theoretically, whether changes in minimum wages lead to higher employment or job
losses depends on where existing wages are set relative to workers’ marginal product
of labor (MPL). If existing wages are set much below the MPL, as in the case of a mo-
nopsonistic firm, a moderate increase in minimum wages can benefit workers without
leading to job losses, because the firm still profits from hiring workers, even at a higher
wage rate (Rebitzer and Taylor, 1995). On the other hand, in the case of a competitive
labor market where equilibrium wages equal the MPL, a minimum wage increase will
lead to job losses.
Past literature on minimum wages tends to focus on youth workers and the fast-food
industry in developed countries, where minimum wages matter most. As many devel-
oping countries are considering adopting minimum wage laws or reforming their2015 Del Carpio et al. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
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changes affect employment in a developing country context. The labor market condi-
tions in developing countries are fairly different to those in developed countries. They
are typically more segmented, filled with less educated labor, characterized by a high ra-
tio of male-to-female workers, and dominated by small and informal firms. Changes in
minimum wages in a developing country can potentially lead to significant heteroge-
neous effects on a large fraction of the labor force.
This paper uses firm-level data from the Indonesia industry survey (SI) to investigate
the impact of minimum wages on employment and firm average wages in the manufac-
turing sector, differentiating between the effects on workers by production1 and non-
production type, education level, and gender. One may expect the presence of differen-
tial wage and employment effects on different types of firms and workers. Yet, there is
limited evidence of whether differential effects are present in the manufacturing sector,
which typically takes a large share of formal sector employment among poorer coun-
tries. Understanding how minimum wage changes affect different types of workers not
only informs policymakers regarding the extent of market power that firms may have
and the potential social cost of minimum wage laws, it also provides policymakers in-
formation on whether additional policy options are needed to assist specific groups
when a uniform minimum wage is introduced.
Indonesian is particularly appropriate for the study of the impacts of minimum wage
changes on wages and employment in manufacturing by types of workers and firms, as
Indonesia has a long history of minimum wage law and has substantial variations of
minimum wage changes over time and across provinces. Furthermore, Indonesia’s
manufacturing census data have broad coverage, track firms over time and contain a
wide range of detailed information. This data advantage permits us to perform firm
fixed effects regressions to estimate the impacts of minimum wage changes. The use of
firm fixed effects regressions helps reduce the potential endogeniety bias that the
Indonesian central and provincial governments set provincial minimum wage changes
taking into consideration the labor market conditions of provinces. The use of firm-
level fixed effects potentially removes unobserved factors that jointly influence em-
ployment in the province and the level of the minimum wages and exploits only vari-
ation in employment within firms. We will come back to this point more carefully in
the methodology section.
We also show heterogeneous effects of minimum wage changes on employment: the
employment effects of minimum wages are significant and negative in small firms and
among less educated workers, but not in large firms and among workers with high
school education and above. These findings are consistent with the theoretical predic-
tions that small firms and less educated workers have little market power and are more
responsive to minimum wage changes. We also find that when minimum wages are
raised, job losses are more severe for non-production workers. Non-production em-
ployment is more adversely affected by increases in minimum wages perhaps because
wages for non-production workers are closer to their MPL. This might be the case be-
cause firms tend have less market power in competing for low-skilled non-production
workers, who can work in most industries. The analysis also yields clear gender differ-
entiated effects of minimum wages: most of the non-production job losses are experi-
enced by female workers. Lastly, the paper also finds that minimum wages are more
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wages in small firms are more binding, and an increase in minimum wages helps to in-
crease the average wages in small firms.
2 Literature review
There is an extensive literature on the impact of minimum wages on employment.2
Earlier studies in the United States provide evidence on positive or no effect of mini-
mum wage increases on employment. For example, Katz and Krueger (1992) find that
employment in Texas fast food industry increased following the Federal minimum wage
hike in 1991 and argue that the result is consistent with fast food restaurants having
monopsonistic power. Card and Krueger (1994) exploit a differences-in-differences ap-
proach to examine the effect of the minimum wage increase in 1992 on employment in
fast food restaurants in the state of New Jersey relatively to those in the neighboring
state of Pennsylvania. They find no effect of the minimum wage hike on employment.
As the restaurants surveyed are near the state border and facing similar economic
conditions, except the change in the minimum wage, unobserved economic conditions
affecting both employment and minimum wage laws are differenced out from the
estimated effect.
More recent US evidence indicates a small negative effect of minimum wage changes
on employment. Neumark and Wascher (2000) reanalyze Card and Krueger’s (1994)
seminal work using payroll data and show a small decrease in employment in New
Jersey relative to Pennsylvania after the 1992 minimum wage increase. Similarly, the
study by Burkhauser et al. (2000) reassess the sensitivity of US studies on the effects of
minimum wages on employment that rely on state-level panel data and show significant
and modest negative effects of minimum wages on teenage employment. In particular,
they demonstrate that past findings on the insignificant effect of minimum wages on
employment are sensitive to the inclusion of year fixed effects, which captures the vari-
ation in the federal minimum wage and eliminates virtually all of the variation in the
minimum wage changes. Past US studies highlight the importance to control for unob-
served economic conditions affecting both employment and minimum wage changes,
to find variation in minimum wage changes at the sub-national level, and to use rela-
tively high quality data to minimize measurement errors.
Recent work from Dube et al. (2010) argue that past research based on cross-state
data is flawed because it does not control for heterogeneities in employment trends,
leading to downward biases in the estimates. By comparing contiguous county pairs in
the United States, the authors find no detrimental employment effect of the minimum
wage. These findings were criticized by Neumark et al. (2014, 2015) in their most re-
cent work, who demonstrated that their approach eliminates valid sources of identify-
ing information and lead to incorrect conclusions. Neumark et al. (2014) confirm
previous findings from the literature that finds strong disemployment effect among the
least skilled workers.
There is a growing volume of empirical studies examining the impacts of minimum
wages on employment in developing countries. The evidence tends to indicate negative ef-
fects of minimum wage hikes on employment, especially in Latin American countries
where the minimum wage level is high relative to the overall wage distribution (Kristensen
and Cunningham, 2006). Bell (1997) finds negative impacts of minimum wage
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no impacts in Mexico, where the minimum wage was way below the market clear-
ing. Maloney and Nunez (2004) find a negative employment effect in both formal
and self-employed sectors in Colombia. Gindling and Terrell (2007) also report a
negative impact on employment in the formal sector in Costa Rica. Similarly,
Nguyen (2010) finds that minimum wage increases led to a decrease in formal
employment among low-wage formal sector workers in Vietnam.
The issue of minimum wages in Indonesia has also received considerable attention. Rama
(2001) uses repeated cross-section of labor force surveys (Sakernas) to create province-level
panel data and assess the impact of minimum wages on employment. He finds a negative
employment effect for small firms (those with less than 20 workers) but a positive effect for
medium-sized and large ones. Islam and Nazara (2000), Suryahadi et al. (2003), and
Pratomo (2011) also use Sakernas to generate province-level panel data and find negative ef-
fects of minimum wages on employment. For instance, using 1988–1999 data, Suryahadi
et al. (2003) estimated the elasticity of employment to minimum wages to be roughly −0.11.
However, since central and provincial governments set minimum wages taken into con-
sideration the labor market conditions of provinces, estimates based on province-level
panel data are likely to suffer from the endogeneity bias discussed above.3 More recently,
Magruder (2011) use district-level panel data to implement a difference in spatial differ-
ences estimation strategy to address the potential endogeneity bias of district fixed effects
analysis. He shows positive effects of the rise in minimum wages on employment in some
sectors—though not in tradable manufacturing—in Indonesia in the early 1990s.
Recent studies use firm data to study the relationship between wages and employment in
Indonesia. Alatas and Cameron (2008) adopt Card and Krueger (1994) differences-in-
differences approach to study the effects of minimum wage changes between 1990 and
1996 on the employment of production workers in clothing, textiles, footwear and leather
firms in greater Jakarta, potentially addresses the problems associated with the use of prov-
ince fixed effects regressions. They find a negative employment impact of minimum wages
on production workers in small firms, with an elasticity estimate in the range of −0.31 to
−0.54, but not in large firms. Harrison and Scorse (2010) examine the impact of anti-
sweatshop campaigns on real wage increases in foreign-owned, exporting firms in textiles,
footwear and apparel sectors and find that a 10% increase in real minimum wages reduces
production worker employment by 1.2%, on average. They also find reduced investment,
falling profits, and increased probability of going out of business (at least in the formal sec-
tor) for smaller firms, but not for large firms. Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2010) use both firm
level and labor force data to show that minimum wage increases reduce gender wage gaps
for workers who completed junior high school, but that the gap worsens for workers who
did not complete primary school.
This paper extends existing literature on the effects of minimum wage changes on em-
ployment. By focusing on both production workers and non-production workers, this paper
sheds light on issues of policy significance. There is a perception that non-production
workers are unaffected by minimum wage changes because they are typically highly-skilled
and highly paid workers, such as managers and researchers, whose wages are significantly
above the minimum wage. For that reason, the impact of minimum wages on them receives
little analysis. However, in reality, a significant portion of non-production workers in the
manufacturing sector actually have low education and perform mainly basic tasks.
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turing labor force, they do account for a much larger fraction in the service sector (and
hence in the entire economy), thus making the findings from this paper relevant to the
economy as a whole. Third, the analysis on employment of workers by educational attain-
ment and gender informs policymakers who set minimum wage levels with the objective to
benefit poorer, often low skilled workers.
One caveat worth highlighting is that by looking at manufacturing firms, this paper
focuses on formal manufacturing employment, and not on employment in the informal
sector, which accounts for approximately 63% of the employed workforce in Indonesia
(Indonesia Job Reports, 2010). Previous studies show that indeed, workers who lose
their formal employment do not necessarily become unemployed but rather they are
likely to go into the informal sector (either in self-employment or working in an infor-
mal firm) (Loayza et al. 2005; Perry et al., 2007; Nguyen 2010). In Indonesia, there are
potentially labor movements and other types of interactions between formal and infor-
mal sectors. For instance, using district-level data, Comola and de Mello (2011) find
that an increase in minimum wages is associated with job losses in the formal sector
and job gains in the informal sector.4 A second caveat is that the analysis does not take
into account exiting firms, thus potentially underestimating the negative impact of
minimum wages. Similarly, we do not take into account new or entering firms, and
hence the results do not fully reflect any “multiplier” effects that minimum wage in-
creases can generate in the labor market. The multiplier effect refers to the possibility
that with higher wages brought about by the minimum wage rise will translate into
higher income and higher purchasing power for workers benefited. Thus, the increase
can generate higher demand for other goods and services (Magruder, 2011). Because
the added employment of new firms is not captured in the panel regression framework,
the multiplier effect cannot be entirely captured in this analysis.3 Context and the minimum wage institution
Indonesia is the world’s fourth most populous country with a population of 238 million. It
is also the largest economy in South East Asia, the world’s 18th largest by nominal gross do-
mestic product (GDP), and a member of G-20 major economies. Despite its on-going eco-
nomic growth, Indonesia is still considered a lower middle income country, according to
the World Bank classification, and has nominal GDP per capita of US$ 2945 in 2010.
Men are largely overrepresented in the Indonesian labor force. Female labor partici-
pation in 2009 is 52 percent, and women are disproportionately represented amongst
the lowest paid in Indonesia (Cuevas et al. 2009). The Indonesian workforce is increas-
ingly becoming more educated, but is still relatively less so compared to neighboring
countries (World Bank, 2010). For example, Indonesia’s overall net secondary enroll-
ment rate was 59 percent in 2006, compared to 61 percent in Vietnam in 2000, 69 per-
cent in Malaysia in 2005, and 71 percent in Thailand in 2006. Similarly, its tertiary
enrollment rate is also low by regional standards. In the manufacturing sector, the focus
of this paper, the vast majority of the workforce only has at most senior high school
education (Indonesia Industry Survey).
The minimum wage legislation in Indonesia was first introduced in the early 1970s for
those working in mainly urban areas. According to the 2003 Law on Manpower Affairs
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needs of a single worker, and the adequate living standard should be derived from a yearly
survey conducted at a provincial level.5 The law also establishes, in general terms, that when
defining the minimum wage, consideration should be given to productivity and economic
growth, as well as to the condition of the labor market, the level of economic development,
income per capita, and the capacity to pay and sustainability of employers.
Different minimum wages are set for different provinces to take into account their differ-
ences in living costs. Most provinces had just one level of minimum wage, with very few ex-
ceptions. Some provinces have different minimum wages set for different districts, or
different sectors of the economy. In our econometric analysis we drop the provinces with
multiple minimum wages. Until the end of 2000, provincial minimum wages were estab-
lished centrally by a decree issued by the Minister of Manpower. To determine minimum
wage levels, the minister received recommendations from provincial governors, who in turn
took advice from provincial councils, made up from representatives of employees, em-
ployers and the government. In practice, employee and employer representatives were usu-
ally government appointees (Suryahadi et al. 2003). Since 2001, the setting of minimum
wage levels was transferred to governors and some cases mayors, who also receive recom-
mendations from councils in their respective areas.
There is substantial variation in minimum wage levels across provinces and over
time. For example, Fig. 1 shows normalized real minimum wages across 33 Indonesia’s
provinces in 2006.6 Note that the real minimum wages are calculated as the nominal
wages divided by provincial CPI, hence they already reflect provinces’ different living
costs. Nevertheless, the differences between the real minimum wages across provinces
remain large; for instance, the level in Jakarta, the capital and largest economic center,
is twice as high as the level in East Java.
Minimum wages in Indonesia also vary markedly over time. Figure 1 shows the evo-
lution of nominal and real minimum wages in Jakarta from 1993 to 2006. The interest
in using minimum wages as an instrument to affect workers welfare grew over time,
and in late 1980s, after pressure from international groups about low wages, workersFig. 1 Normalized real minimum wages across Indonesian provinces in 2006. Source: Indonesia Statistical
Agency (BPS). Note: Real minimum wage in Jakarta normalized to 100
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reported by Suryahadi et al. (2001), in the first half of the 1990s minimum wages tripled
in nominal terms and more than doubled in real terms in a period of five years. During
the second half of the 1990s, nominal minimum wages continued to increase but not
in real terms due to high levels of inflation. In 1998, the real minimum wage declined
as much as 30% due to the financial crisis, although the nominal wage steadily climbed
(see Fig. 2). After the crisis, minimum wages re-emerged as a key element of economic
and social policies, with sharp increases in nominal minimum wages. By 2001, the real
wage was back at the pre-crisis level, but since then has remained flat.
Compared to other growing economies in East Asia, the monthly minimum wage
relative to the countries’ GDP per capita is higher in Indonesia than in Thailand or
China,7 two competing economies. Both Vietnam and the Philippines have higher ra-
tios, while Malaysia still had no statutory minimum wage until very recently.
4 Data and descriptive analysis
The main data source used in the analysis is the annual manufacturing census survey of
Indonesia (Survei Industri or SI). It was collected and compiled by the Indonesian govern-
ment’s statistical agency (Badan Pusat Statistik or BPS). The survey includes all manufac-
turing firms that have more than 20 employees, and the multi-modular survey captures
detailed questions about the firm and its operation, including output, intermediate inputs,
employment, capital, ownership and balance sheet.8 The data used in this paper range (in-
clusively) from 1993 to 2006. The number of observations varies from about 18,000 firms in
1993 to about 29,000 firms in 2006.9 In terms of employment, the survey divides a firm’s
employment into those of production and of non-production workers, along with the total
wage bill for each category, from which it is easy to calculate average wages for production
workers and non production workers. For four years 1995, 1996, 1997 and 2006, the survey
also has information about the exact educational compositions of its workforce, allowing us
to perform analysis on the effects of minimum wage changes on the educational compos-
ition of the workforce. Minimum wage data are obtained from BPS. A summary table of
variables used in the paper is in the Appendix.
The paper also uses, albeit selectively, data derived from the National Socio-
Economic Survey (Susenas). The Susenas is an annual multi-purpose household levelFig. 2 Normalized nominal and real minimum wages in Jakarta, 1993–2006. Source: Indonesia Statistical
Agency (BPS). Note: Nominal and real minimum wages in Jakarta in 1993 are normalized to 100
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as various socio-economic, demographic, and labor characteristics of individuals and
households. Comparable waves of this survey are available; however, given that the ana-
lysis presented in this paper focuses on firms, the data from Susenas is only used to
better understand the results and contextualize the discussion.
The analysis starts by looking at how high minimum wages are relative to workers’ wage
rates. In order to do so, ideally one would like to have detailed wage distributions within a
firm. However, since the data only provides the numbers of production and non-production
workers and their respective total wage bills, the calculation focuses on firm average wages.
Here minimum wages are compared to the average wage ratio across firms. Figure 3 shows
the country average of the minimum wage- firm average wage ratio. It fluctuates from about
0.085 in 1993 to about 0.177 in 2006.
An in-depth look at minimum wage to firm average wage ratio across firms in 2006
reveals that for the majority of firms, the ratio is at the low end (Fig. 4). About 76% of
all firms have a ratio less than 0.1 (i.e. the minimum wage is less than 10% of the firm’s
average wage). For less than 1% of them, the minimum wage is larger than the firm’s
average wage, indicating that compliance with minimum wage law might be an issue.
This paper focuses on the asymmetric impacts of minimum wages on small firms and
large firms. Following Alatas and Cameron (2008), small firms are defined as firms that
always have 150 workers or less, and large firms are those that always have more than
150 workers. In the data, there are about 27,000 small firms and about 4500 large firms
that appear in the time period evaluated (1993–2006). Small firms and large firms in
Indonesia have fundamentally different characteristics. Small firms are overwhelmingly
domestic,10 have lower productivity levels, lower wages, and are slightly more concen-
trated in labor-intensive manufacturing11 (see Table 1).
Figure 5 reveals that a vast majority of firms are small. In 2006, about 50% of firms
have only 20–40 workers. Out of 29,000 firms, there are only 802 firms with more than
1000 workers and 38 firms with more than 5000 workers.
5 Empirical strategy
The analysis focuses on four outcome variables of interest: employment of production
workers, employment of non-production workers, changes in workers’ educational
composition, and real average wages. We exploit the firm panel data to estimate a set
of firm fixed effects regressions. In addition, all regression specifications include yearFig. 3 Minimum wages relative to within firm average wages, 1993–2006. Source: Indonesia Industry
Survey (SI)
Fig. 4 Firm distribution of minimum wage to average wage ratio, 2006. Source: Indonesia Industry
Survey (SI)
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interest rates, exchange rates, and financial crisis, which influence the economic envir-
onment in which all firms operate.
The firm fixed effects regressions take the following form:
log Y ijt
  ¼ αi þ αt þ β log MinWagejt
 þ β′XXijt þ εijt
Log (Yijt) is the natural log of the outcome of interest of firm i in province j in year t.Log (MinWagejt) is the log of real minimum wage in province j in year t. The coeffi-
cient β measures the elasticity of the outcome of interest with respect to real minimum
wages. Xijt is a set of time-varying firm specific control variables. αi is a set of firm fixed
effects, while αt is a set of year fixed effects.
12 The firm fixed effects specification as-
sumes that a province’s minimum wage does not respond to changes in employment
and wage payment of a particular firm, and the firm varies its employment behavior in
response to changes in the minimum wage in the province. This assumption is likely to
hold with firm level fixed effects. This is so because of the large heterogeneity among
firms, and the near impossibility for one or even a few minimum wage levels to be set
in response to every single firm’s employment situation.
The endogeneity bias is likely more severe when cross-province data is used to identify
the effects of the minimum wage on the outcome of interest. The provincial government is
much more likely to take the province-aggregate labor market condition into account when
setting the minimum wage level. For example, the provincial government might raise the
province’s minimum wage when it observes a higher employment level in the province.
Thus, estimates based on province data are more likely to suffer from endogeneity bias and
biased upward. In the next section, we present evidence that the minimum wage levels are











Small firms 24,079 3.71% 50.09 67.6 73
Large firms 5302 23.35% 100 100 64
Source: Indonesia Industry Survey (SI)
Fig. 5 Distribution of firm size, 2006. Source: Indonesia Industry Survey (SI). Note: Only firms with fewer than
1000 workers are included
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Four major groups of regressions are shown in this section. The first group focuses on
the impact on production worker employment. The second group focuses on the im-
pact on non-production worker employment. The third group focuses on the impact
by educational category of workers, and the last group focuses on the impact on real
wage firms have to pay their workers. The analysis in the paper and the discussion is
based on data from 1993 through 2006.6.1 Employment of production workers and non-production workers
Table 2 reports estimates for all firms based on regression specifications (1) and (2) with the
log of paid production worker employment as the dependent variable (we focus on paid
workers only). Furthermore, log of firm’s age (Firm age), percentage owned by foreigners
(Foreign), percentage of output exported (Export), and percentage owned by local and cen-
tral government (Government), are included as additional regressors in some specifications
to control for some other factors that affect firms' hiring decisions.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 2 present the effects of minimum wage changes on em-
ployment of paid production workers for the whole sample of firms. Column (1) shows
that the for every 10% increase in minimum wage, employment of production workers
within a firm is expected to fall by 0.47% on average. Column (2) shows the elasticity of
production employment to minimum wages become −0.34 and statistically insignificant
when we include a set of additional regressors.13 The slightly drop in the coefficient of
the minimum wage when other regressors are added could indicate that the decision of
raising the minimum wage may take into account the basic characteristics of firms in
provinces. For example, minimum wage may increase at a faster pace in provinces
where there is a higher share of export-oriented firms. As we show later in this paper
(Section f ) results for production employment are robust to different time periods
within our sample. When the years crisis are dropped from the sample, the coefficient
of the minimum wage remain unchanged (negative and statistically significant).
The current estimate is much smaller than previous estimates from other studies. For
example, Alatas and Cameron (2008) estimated that employment of production
Table 2 Employment effects of minimum wages on production workers
Dependent variable: Log (Number of paid production workers)
All firms Small firms Large firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log (Min. Wage) −0.0469*** −0.0342** −0.0251** −0.0265* −0.0270 0.0166
(0.0136) (0.0161) (0.0120) (0.0145) (0.0265) (0.0312)
Log (Firm Age) 0.1881*** 0.0982*** 0.2293***
(0.0065) (0.0056) (0.0135)
Foreign Share 0.0019*** 0.0007*** 0.0013***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Export Share 0.0007*** 0.0005*** 0.0003***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Govt. Share 0.0001 −0.0000 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Fixed Effects Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 290,118 206,375 221,300 157,761 66,677 47,117
Number of Firms 40,169 38,563 35,188 33,534 9285 8893
R-squared 0.916 0.919 0.802 0.809 0.846 0.851
Notes: The sample includes only firms with non-zero production and non-production workers, firms that continuously
observed from year to year, and firms observed more than once during the sample period (1993–2006). Columns (2) (4) and
(6) have fewer observations than other columns because the additional regressors have missing values in 2001, 2002, 2003,
and 2005. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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of production workers would fall by 1.2%, for every 10% increase in minimum wage.
This can partly be explained by the fact that all three studies use different samples and
evaluate the impact on different time periods.
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 2 examine the effects of minimum wage changes on
employment of paid production workers among small firms (i.e., firms with 150 or
fewer workers during the sample period). The results suggest that minimum wage
changes have a negative effect on employment of production workers of small firms,
but the coefficient is statistically insignificant in both specifications. Columns (5) and
(6) report estimates for firms that always employed more than 150 workers during the
sample period. The effect of minimum wages on employment of production workers is
statistically insignificant in both specifications. The coefficient estimates are smaller in
magnitudes while standard errors are similar compared to those for small firms, sug-
gesting that employment of production workers in large firms are not responsive to
minimum wage changes.
In the second group of regressions, the focus is on employment of non-production
workers. As mentioned above, past studies tend not to focus on non-production
workers, as conventional wisdom associate non-production workers with skilled,
highly-paid workers. Although the total number of non-production workers is about
one-fifth of production workers’ in the data and the number is stable for the entire
sample period, household data from Susenas show that the estimated share of non-
production workers (ages 15–65) in the manufacturing sector in 2006 is non-trivial,
about 47%. Presumably, many of them work in small firms with less than 20 workers,
which are not covered in the survey. Table 3 summarizes the results using the log of
Table 3 Employment effects of min. wages on non- prod. workers
Dependent variable: Log (Number of paid non-production workers)
All firms Small firms Large firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log (Min. Wage) −0.0615*** −0.0554** −0.0649*** −0.0779*** 0.0105 0.0635
(0.0206) (0.0250) (0.0213) (0.0263) (0.0409) (0.0494)
Log (Firm Age) 0.1942*** 0.0954*** 0.2516***
(0.0098) (0.0100) (0.0210)
Foreign Share 0.0012*** 0.0017*** 0.0000
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Export Share 0.0007*** 0.0006*** 0.0003**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Govt. Share 0.0007** 0.0007*** 0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Fixed Effects Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 245,963 168,741 179,746 121,950 64,414 45,568
Number of firms 36,893 34,504 31,821 29,389 9159 8762
R-squared 0.873 0.876 0.814 0.821 0.761 0.773
Notes: The sample includes only firms with non-zero production and non-production workers, firms that continuously
observed from year to year, and firms observed more than once during the sample period (1993–2006). Columns (2) (4) and
(6) have fewer observations than other columns because the additional regressors have missing values in 2001, 2002, 2003,
and 2005. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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firms, and large firms, respectively.
Table 3 indicates that the effect of minimum wages on employment is more pronounced
and significant for non-production workers than for production workers. Column (1) shows
that a 10% increase in real minimum wages will lead to a 0.61% decline in employment of
non-production workers in all firms, on average. Column (2) shows that including add-
itional regressors does not alter the estimated elasticity of employment of non-production
workers to minimum wage in all firms. The negative impact of minimum wages on employ-
ment of non-production workers is more significant than that on production workers.
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 3 show that the negative effect of minimum wages on
employment of non-production workers is pronounced among small firms. The esti-
mates suggest that for every 10% increase in the real minimum wage, employment of
non-production workers among small firms is expected to fall between 0.64 percent
and 0.77 percent. On the other hand, Columns (5) and (6) shows that minimum wage
changes have no negative effect on the employment of non-production workers in large
firms. The estimates are positive and insignificant in both specifications. However,
under alternative definitions of large firms, changes in the minimum wage may have a
statistically significant and still positive effect on the employment of non-production
workers (see in section f the robustness analysis).
The negative effect of minimum wage changes on employment of non-production
workers is several times larger than that of production workers. This is initially surprising
because non-production workers are generally thought as more educated than production
workers, and therefore should be less vulnerable to changes in minimum wages. While
non-production workers are indeed generally more educated than production workers, a
Del Carpio et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:17 Page 13 of 30large fraction of them still has low levels of education. As we can see in Fig. 6, close to 85
percent of non-production workers in manufacturing have less than high school education,
while this figure rises to 98 percent among production workers. The heterogeneity of non-
production jobs, and that low end non-production workers receive low wages might explain
the negative impact of minimum wages on non-production workers. We also observe a high
heterogeneity in the gender composition of non-production employment. While there is an
equal distribution of production employment among women and men, non-production em-
ployment is mostly performed by male, almost 70% of workers are male and 30% are
women.
Household data also confirms these points. There are at least three distinct occupa-
tion categories among non-production workers in manufacturing: management and ad-
ministrative staff, sales people, and workers performing menial tasks. As expected,
workers in the management and administrative category have higher levels of educa-
tion, where at least 80% of them have completed high school. On the other hand, about
40 percent of sales people and 70 percent of workers performing basic tasks have not
completed high school (Fig. 7).
Household data also show that over half of all non-production workers with less than
primary school education earn at or below the national minimum wage (Fig. 8), sug-
gesting that they account for the majority of job losses.14 These workers earn low
wages, are more likely low skilled (with primary education or less) and tend to perform
non-essential tasks in the factories, thus making them extremely vulnerable to wage
hikes. In part (c) the discussion delves deeper into different education categories of pro-
duction and non-production workers.6.2 Asymmetric impacts of minimum wages on large firms and small firms
It is critical to understand why minimum wages hurt employment of non-production
workers in small firms but not in large firms. Perhaps small firms tend to pay their
workers lower wages on average, and thus must cut employment aggressively in re-
sponse to a higher minimum wage. In contrast, large firms are less responsive to mini-
mum wage changes, as they may not only have monopsony power in the labor market,
but also pay higher wages on average due to higher labor productivity and the extensive
use of capital. Data confirm that the average wages of workers in small firms areFig. 6 Education composition of production and non-production workers, 2006. Source: Indonesia Industry
Survey (SI)
Fig. 7 Education levels of distinct types of non-production workers in the manufacturing sector, 2006.
Source: Susenas 2006
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The difference is much more pronounced among non-production workers: average
non-production wages in large firms are at least twice as high as wages in small firms.
It is then important to understand why large firms pay workers higher salaries.
One reason could be related to different skill levels (proxied by their educational
attainment). Among non-production workers, the percentage of workers with at
least bachelor education is twice as high in large firms as in small firms (16.1 per-
cent compared to 8.7 percent, in 2006) (Fig. 10). This probably accounts for a part
of the wage discrepancy between non-production wages in large firms and small
firms. On the other hand, the differences between production workers with at least
a high school diploma and those without are similar between large firms and small
firms.
Another potential reason is that large firms might have a higher degree of
mechanization, which explains why the value added per worker in large firms is higher
and workers in large firms are better paid (see Table 1). The data seem to confirm this
conjecture: the estimated value of machine capital per worker is much larger in largeFig. 8 Wages for non-production “Basic” workers with low education levels in the manufacturing sector,
2006. Source: Susenas, 2006
Fig. 9 Normalized firm-average real wage of production workers and non-production workers in small firms
and large firms. Source: Indonesia Industry Survey (SI). Note: Firm average real wage of non-production
workers in large firms in 1993 is normalized to 1
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timate for firms in Jakarta area shows that the estimated value of machine capital per
worker of large firms is 1.4 to 16 times larger than that of small firms.
Figure 9 also reveals that on average, non-production workers receive higher wages
than production workers. The fact that non-production workers are more vulnerable to
minimum wage rises could indicate several things. First, there may be a large dispersion
in wages (or wage inequality) among non-production workers within a firm; unfortu-
nately, the data does not allow us to confirm this point. Second, and related to the first
point, the large dispersion of wages within the group likely hide the fact that a subset
of nonproduction workers earns very little (for instance, janitors and cleaners), while a
subset earn very high wages (for instance, managers).6.3 Educational compositions of production and non-production workers
The third group of regressions helps look at employment changes by education in re-
sponse to minimum wage changes. There are several questions of interest here. First,
which groups of workers are most hurt by minimum wage changes? Second, do firmsFig. 10 Educational composition of workers in large firms and small firms, 2006. Source: Indonesia Industry
Survey (SI)
Fig. 11 Wage density curves for non-production workers by education level across all economic sectors,
2006. Source: Susenas, 2006
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increases? Since detailed skill portfolios of workers are not available, we use education
as a proxy for skill to examine these questions.
The focus of this part of the analysis is on small firms because they are where the
majority of the workforce is, and where there are interesting dynamics. Employment of
production and non-production workers is analyzed separately. For each group of
workers, the analysis measures percentage changes of the following education categor-
ies: at most primary education (primary); junior high and incomplete senior high
(juniorseniorhigh); high school diploma (highschool); university and above (bachelor).15
Note that data are only available for 1995, 1996, 1997, and 2006.
Table 4 reports the estimates for employment of production workers by educational
category. Results shows that production workers with lower levels of education (senior
high and below) are negatively affected by an increase in the minimum wage. In par-
ticular, the effect on production workers with junior and senior high school education
is significant. Within a firm, a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage is expected to
decrease the number of workers with junior high or senior high school education by 2
percent on average. On the other hand, the effects on production workers with high
school degree and above are positive and insignificant.
Table 5 summarizes the results from the analysis of employment of non-production
workers by educational category. The negative effects of minimum wage changes are signifi-
cant for non-production workers without high school diploma but insignificant for those
with at least a high school diploma. A 10% increase in the minimum wage causes employ-
ment of non-production workers with no more than primary education to fall by 2.9 per-
cent. This effect is several times larger than the average decline. Similarly to production
workers’ employment, minimum wage increases hurt non-production workers without high
school education. Moreover, there is no evidence of substitution from less educated workers
Table 4 Employment effects of minimum wages on production workers in small firms by
educational category
Dependent variable: Log (Employment of production workers)
Primary Jr. Sr. High High School Bachelor
Log (Min. Wage) −0.0855 −0.1957*** 0.0233 0.0891
(0.0723) (0.0552) (0.2155) (0.1978)
Log (Firm Age) 0.0940*** 0.0691*** −0.2686*** −0.2768***
(0.0272) (0.0202) (0.0688) (0.0779)
Foreign Share −0.0008 0.0002 0.0032* 0.0012
(0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0017) (0.0015)
Export Share 0.0003 0.0007*** −0.0001 0.0009
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0007)
Govt. Share 0.0006 0.0013*** 0.0001 −0.0004
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0014) (0.0013)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firms 16,360 19,036 3592 3087
Observations 35,634 40,865 5159 4502
R-squared 0.8622 0.8645 0.8953 0.9104
Notes: The sample includes only small firms with non-zero production and non-production workers, small firms that continuously
observed from year to year, and small firms observed more than once during the sample period. Small firms are firms which
always have 150 or fewer workers. Data of workers’ educational composition are available in 1995, 1996, 1997, and 2006. Robust
standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses. ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1
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above, non-production jobs, particularly those performed by low-educated workers, are not
management or research related, but mostly menial jobs.
Appendix presents the impacts of minimum wage on large firms. We do not observe
any significant effects of the minimum wage on the employment of production workers
(Appendix). This is probably for large firms, with more capital, the marginal productiv-
ity of each production worker is higher than that in small firms. Therefore, production
workers in large firms are less affected by minimum wage changes. For non-production
workers in large firms, the impacts of minimum wage changes are not as trivial. They
reduce employment of non-production workers with junior- high and high school
education and increase the employment of workers with less than primary education
(Appendix). This result could indicate that large firms tend to substitute more educated
workers (those more likely to be formal and earning the minimum wage) for less edu-
cated workers (who are more likely to be informal and paid under the minimum wage),
while compliance may be going down and overall employment remained unchanged.
Figure 12 shows the wage distribution of non-production workers by education level
for all sectors of the economy and illustrates the tendency of less educated non-
production workers to earn low wages and be more vulnerable to minimum wage
changes. The first three diagrams in the first row show the wage distributions of non-
production workers with no or less than primary education, with primary education
and with junior and senior high school education. Almost half of them receive lower
wages than the (national average) minimum wage—shown as the vertical lines in the
diagrams.
Table 5 Employment effects of minimum wages on non-production workers in small firms by
educational category
Dependent variable: Log (Employment of non-production workers)
Primary Jr. Sr. High High School Bachelor
Log (Min. Wage) −0.2915* −0.1553*** −0.0751 −0.0490
(0.1660) (0.0497) (0.1114) (0.1026)
Log (Firm Age) 0.0483 0.1104*** −0.1204*** −0.1803***
(0.0531) (0.0191) (0.0400) (0.0349)
Foreign Share −0.0027* 0.0021*** 0.0008 −0.0006
(0.0016) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0009)
Export Share −0.0008 0.0001 0.0006 0.00003
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Govt. Share 0.0010 0.00004 −0.0016 −0.0017*
(0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0009)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firms 7707 19,126 7234 7208
Observations 13,571 41,823 11,982 12,523
R-squared 0.8888 0.8596 0.8431 0.8239
Notes: The sample includes only small firms with non-zero production and non-production workers, small firms that
continuously observed from year to year, and small firms observed more than once during the sample period. Small firms
are firms which always have 150 or fewer workers. Data of workers’ educational composition are available in 1995, 1996,
1997, and 2006. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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The fourth group of regressions focuses on the minimum wage effect on employment by
gender. The question of interest is whether a rise in minimum wages attracts broader fe-
male participation to the formal labor force in the manufacturing sector or leads to greater
job losses among women workers. As shown before, of all working-age women only 52 per-
cent of them were actively working or looking for work in 2006; this is low compared to
male participation in the country (86 percent). Time-use surveys from around the world re-
veal that women are largely responsible for housework and raising children (Miranda,
2011). As a result of the double burden some studies conclude that women’s reservation
wage in many cases is higher than what the market is willing to pay them, keeping them
out of the labor force. Recent evidence on the other hand shows that many women, espe-
cially among lower economic quintiles, lower their reservation wage and enter the labor
force to finance basic expenditures of having children (Priebe, 2010). Thus, one can argue
that a rise in the minimum wages could potentially attract women to the labor market. On
the other hand, women are usually less educated and less well-paid than men in developing
countries. Women may also suffer from gender discrimination in the labor market, as
women earn between 70 and 80 percent the wages of men for similar work in many coun-
tries (Hausmann et al. 2010).16 Women workers, especially less educated ones, may be the
first laid off when firms are compelled to pay higher minimum wages.
Table 6 shows the detailed analysis. Four items are measured here: employment of
male production workers, of female production workers, of male non-production
workers, and of female non-production workers. The dependent variables are log of
employment of the four categories; and as in previous sections the same control vari-
ables and firms fixed effects are included.
Fig. 12 Wage distribution of low skilled non-production workers in 2006, by gender. Source: Susenas, 2006
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workers, especially those performing non-production jobs. They bear most of the bur-
den of job losses. The negative impact on female non-production workers is large, sta-
tistically significant and robust. A 10 percent increase in minimum wage leads to 0.6
percent – 0.7 percent decline in female non-production employment in small firms.
The impact of minimum wages on male workers is negative, with a smaller coefficient
and not statistically significant.
The firm survey does not have detailed information on education of non-production
workers by gender and it is not possible to disentangle the gender effects by education.
We use household survey in 2006 to examine the wage distribution of non-production
workers with primary education or less by gender (Fig. 12) to provide further analysis.
Note that the vertical line indicates the value of a hypothetical national minimum wage
in 2006. The figures show that the wage densities for women are concentrated to the
left of the line, but not for men with similarly low levels of education. Thus, the results
are consistent with the view that non-production female workers are more likely laid
off when the minimum wage is raised because they are less well paid than men.6.5 Wage rates of production workers and non-production workers
This section examines if changes in minimum wages have impacts on firms’ average
wage rates. The relevant question is whether firms adjust their wages in response to
minimum wages. One cannot fully rule out the issue of reverse causality because it is
plausible that the government sets minimum wages to take into account the aggregate
wage growth. In other words, higher minimum wages are because the aggregate wage is
higher. Therefore, the estimates for the impact of minimum wages on the actual wage
rates can be biased upward. But as explained before, it is very difficult to expect that all
firms are coordinating the way in which they set their wages and one or a few
Table 6 Employment effects of minimum wages on male and female workers in small firms
Dependent variable:
Log of Employment of Production
Workers
Log of Employment of Non-Production
Workers
Male Female Male Female
Log (Min. Wage) −0.0258 −0.0208 −0.058** −0.0430 −0.0365 −0.0290 −0.061*** −0.0692**
(0.0174) (0.0210) (0.0245) (0.0309) (0.0236) (0.0289) (0.0227) (0.0287)
Log (Firm Age) 0.1202*** 0.0964*** 0.1003*** 0.0802***
(0.0081) (0.0122) (0.0110) (0.0108)
Foreign Share 0.0007** 0.0001 0.0019*** 0.0013***
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Export Share 0.0003*** 0.0007*** 0.0004** 0.0005***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Govt. Share 0.0001 −0.0005** 0.0009*** −0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 167,873 113,780 126,026 83,780 159,346 106,834 129,736 85,473
Number of Firms 27,500 25,894 23,351 21,616 27,122 25,282 23,897 21,890
R-squared 0.8450 0.8498 0.8522 0.8591 0.8086 0.8104 0.7678 0.7708
Notes: The sample includes only small firms with non-zero production and non-production workers, small firms that
continuously observed from year to year, and small firms observed more than once during the sample period. Small firms
are firms which always have 150 or fewer workers. Both paid and unpaid workers are included as data since 2001 do not
permit separation of paid and unpaid workers by gender. The additional regressors have missing values in 2001, 2002,
2003, and 2005. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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fixed effects, it is likely that reverse causality is mitigated. The dependent variable of
interest is log of real firm-average wages (in cash and in kind) per worker. The results
for production workers are presented in Table 7, and the results for non-production
workers are in Table 8. The list of other control variables is similar.
Results reveal that in general, the association between minimum wages and firms’ ac-
tual wages, for both production workers and non-production workers, is robust and
significant. For production workers, a 10 percent increase in real minimum wages is as-
sociated with a 1.8 percent increase in wages in small firms, but only 0.8 percent in-
crease in wages in large firms. For non-production workers, a 10 percent increase in
real minimum wages is associated with a 1.65 percent increase in wages in small firms,
but only 1.2 percent in larger firms. The association between minimum wages and ac-
tual wages is significant, of large magnitude in small firms, but less so in larger firms.
This suggests that wages in small firms are more sensitive to changes in minimum
wages, which is consistent with the fact that on average, wages in small firms are sig-
nificantly lower. In other words, small firms are more likely to raise their wages in re-
sponse to an increase in minimum wages because their wages are more binding.6.6 Robustness checks
To make sure the results are not driven by any critical economic events, we exclude
the crisis years of 1997 and 1998. We show that for non-production workers, results
Table 7 Minimum wages and average wages of production workers
Dependent variable: Log(Real average wage of production workers)
All Firms All Firms Small Firms Small Firms Large Firms Large Firms
Log (Minimum Wage) 0.1060*** 0.1537*** 0.1317*** 0.1844*** 0.0607 0.0825*
(0.0190) (0.0226) (0.0217) (0.0260) (0.0391) (0.0473)
Log (Firm Age) 0.1001*** 0.0960*** 0.1322***
(0.0090) (0.0104) (0.0200)
Foreign Share 0.0008*** 0.0013*** 0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Export Share −0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Govt. Share 0.0010*** 0.0015*** 0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 233,442 159,959 170,667 115,569 62,775 44,390
Number of Firms 32,388 30,941 27,855 26,269 8585 8295
R-squared 0.6221 0.6558 0.6678 0.7044 0.5281 0.5926
Notes: The sample includes only firms with non-zero production and non-production workers, firms that continuously
observed from year to year, and firms observed more than once during the sample period. Small firms are firms which
always have 150 or fewer workers; large firms are firms which always have more than 150 workers. The additional
regressors have missing values in 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2005. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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workers, we find that the effect of the minimum wage on employment varies in terms
of cyclical economic activity.
Table 9 shows the results of minimum wage changes on employment of paid produc-
tion workers. Column (1) shows similar estimates to the main one (see Table 3). When
the additional regressors are added in Column (2), the coefficient of the minimum wage
remains significant and negative. Unlike the main results, the estimated elasticity for
small firms is statistically significant and negative (see columns (3) and (4)). The effect
of minimum wages on employment of production workers in large firms is statistically
insignificant in both specifications when the sample of firms for 1997 and 1998 is
dropped (see columns (5) and (6)). These results suggest that in large firms results are
robust for the entire period. Similar to the main results, Table 10 reports the results of
the effects of minimum wage changes on employment of paid non-production workers.
The results for this group remain unchanged for the different samples.
Table 11 examines the robustness of our results to alternative definitions of small/
large firms. We use different cut-offs to define a small and large firm: 50, 100, 150, 200
and 300 employees respectively. In all specifications, the effect of the minimum wage
on non-production employment in small firms is negative and significant. However, for
large firms, the results are positive and becoming more significant when larger cut-offs
are used. When the cut-offs of 50,100, and 150 are used, minimum wages have positive
but statistically insignificant impacts on non-production workers. When the cut-offs of
200 and 300 are used, minimum wage changes significantly increase non-production
employment. This is probably due to the substitutions from workers with junior high
and high school education to workers with primary education (see Appendix).
Table 8 Minimum wages and average wages of non-production workers
Dependent variable: Log(Real average wage of non-production workers)
All Firms All Firms Small Firms Small Firms Large Firms Large Firms
Log (Minimum Wage) 0.0600** 0.1654*** 0.0493* 0.1659*** 0.0708 0.1186*
(0.0254) (0.0306) (0.0293) (0.0355) (0.0532) (0.0642)
Log (Firm Age) 0.1015*** 0.0900*** 0.1183***
(0.0120) (0.0137) (0.0283)
Foreign Share 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0020***
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005)
Export Share 0.0004*** 0.0003 0.0006***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Govt. Share 0.0009*** 0.0012*** 0.0005
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 226,507 158,153 163,898 113,839 62,609 44,314
Number of Firms 31,798 30,112 27,253 25,434 8573 8286
R-squared 0.6053 0.6405 0.6281 0.6767 0.5154 0.5571
Notes: The sample includes only firms with non-zero production and non-production workers, firms that continuously
observed from year to year, and firms observed more than once during the sample period. Small firms are firms which
always have 150 or fewer workers; large firms are firms which always have more than 150 workers. The additional
regressors have missing values in 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2005. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Table 12 presents the effects of the minimum wage on employment of production
and non-production workers by sex and education levels for small firms. As men-
tioned before, we concentrated in small firms because they are where the majority
of the workforce is, and where there are interesting dynamics. The job losses are
primarily driven by those among non-production workers. For every 10% increase in
minimum wage, employment of non-production workers drops 0.78%. And the vul-
nerability is much more accentuated for women than men. This result also has im-
plications for workers in other sectors of the economy where the concentration of
non-production workers is higher. Industries such as wholesale and retail and tour-
ism in the services sector for example, have high concentration of (women) non-
production workers with low levels of skill.
In addition, the importance of skill levels came through very clearly in the analysis,
where less educated workers are hit hardest when minimum wage hikes take place.
They are workers with primary, junior and senior high education. On the other hand,
better skilled workers (with a high school education and above) are not affected. The
underlying problem is that in the case of low-skilled (or unskilled) workers, higher
minimum wage levels likely exceed their level of productivity. Thus, increases in the
minimum wages mean that small firms, which are those that employ these workers
most often and have low capital intensity, have to lay off non-essential workers. As bet-
ter educated workers are not added in response to minimum wage increases, there is
no evidence of substitutions between less educated and better educated workers. In-
stead, low skill workers are simply laid off by their employers.
Table 9 Employment effects of minimum wages on production workers –restricted sample
Dependent variable: Log (Number of paid production workers)
All firms Small firms Large firms
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log (Min. Wage) −0.0436*** −0.0402** −0.0223* −0.0315** −0.0209 0.0125
(0.014) (0.017) (0.012) (0.015) (0.026) (0.032)
Log (Firm Age) 0.195*** 0.0997*** 0.237***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.015)
Foreign Share 0.00175*** 0.000582** 0.00133***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Export Share 0.00115*** 0.000894*** 0.000469***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Govt. Share 0.000155 5.42E-05 −2.49E-05
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 246,539 163,065 187,686 124,383 57,133 37,602
Number of Firms 39,734 38,242 34,610 33,040 9119 8728
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: This sample excludes observations for the years of the Asian financial crisis (1997 and 1998). Robust standard
errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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This paper uses firm level data to investigate the employment and wage impacts of mini-
mum wage changes in Indonesia, differentiating the effects on production workers and
non-production workers, by educational category, and by gender profile. The use of firm
level data allows the inclusion of firm fixed effects, which significantly reduces the extent ofTable 10 Employment effects of minimum wages on non-production workers –restricted sample
Dependent variable: Log (Number of paid non-production workers)
All firms Small firms Large firms
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Log (Min. Wage) −0.0703*** −0.0402** −0.0717*** −0.0900*** 0.00594 0.0563
(0.0205) (0.0165) (0.0213) (0.0269) (0.0404) (0.0499)
Log (Firm Age) 0.195*** 0.0990*** 0.264***
(0.00712) (0.0112) (0.0228)
Foreign Share 0.00175*** 0.00143*** 2.21e-05
(0.000225) (0.000418) (0.000436)
Export Share 0.00115*** 0.000785*** 0.000334*
(9.35e-05) (0.000177) (0.000183)
Govt. Share 0.000155 0.000592** 0.000390
(0.000173) (0.000246) (0.000437)
Observations 211,617 163,065 154,936 97,313 55,189 36,372
Number of Firms 36,440 38,242 31,234 28,812 8989 8593
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: This sample excludes observations for the years of the Asian financial crisis (1997 and 1998). Robust standard
errors clustered by firm are reported in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Table 11 Employment effects of minimum wages on non-production workers using different cut-offs for the definition of small/large firms
n = 50 n = 100 n = 150 n = 200 n = 300
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Small (<50) Large (>50) Small (<100) Large (>100) Small (<150) Large (>150) Small (<200) Large (>200) Small (<300) Large (>300)
Log (Minimum Wage) −0.0909*** 0.0117 −0.0873*** 0.0358 −0.0778*** 0.0635 −0.0888*** 0.147*** −0.0770*** 0.174***
(0.0319) (0.0350) (0.0276) (0.0431) (0.0262) (0.0494) (0.0257) (0.0533) (0.0252) (0.0635)
Observations 76,645 90,494 107,784 60,291 122,599 45,671 131,424 36,958 142,011 26,500
R-squared 0.005 0.015 0.007 0.013 0.008 0.013 0.009 0.013 0.010 0.012
Number of plant_id 22,043 17,789 27,199 11,542 29,419 8772 30,604 7191 31,891 5273
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses

















Table 12 Employment effects of minimum wages on non-production workers and production
workers by sex and education levels-small firms







Jr. Sr. High −0.1957*** −0.1553***
(0.055) (0.050)






*significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 10% level
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sector, which constitutes a significant formal component of the Indonesian labor force.
The paper finds that in the manufacturing sector, minimum wages have negative em-
ployment effects on small firms but not on large firms. Since there are many more
small firms, the aggregate effect of the minimum wages is to have an overall negative
effect on formal employment, i.e. they lead to losses of formal jobs. The negative effects
are largely concentrated among labor intensive firms with unskilled or less skilled
workers. This finding has implications beyond the manufacturing sector, especially be-
cause Indonesia, like many developing economies, has a large concentration of low-
skilled workers employed in small firms. Thus, sharp raises of the minimum wages
could prevent job creation and retention, and a reduction in formal employment. As
shown in other countries, increases in the minimum wages without commensurate
raises in worker productivity levels can lead to unemployment or increase informality
among low-skill workers. Nonetheless, the negative effects of minimum wage changes
on employment are much smaller than previous estimates.
Minimum wages are also found to be correlated with firms’ average wages. They are
more correlated with average wages in small firms than in large firms, which suggests
that minimum wages are significantly more binding for small firms who on average pay
workers less than large firms do.
The results of the paper indicate that assistance to vulnerable groups is neces-
sary when minimum wage increases are implemented. In the Indonesian context
they are low-skilled, female and non-production workers: they tend to lose jobs in
manufacturing when minimum wages are raised. While we acknowledge that mini-
mum wage increases might boost social welfare (from increased income and hence
consumption of workers who retain jobs) and improve productivity, the fact that
we find vulnerable groups calls for assistance programs to help them during the
unemployment period. The assistance includes providing unemployment benefits,
training and assisting the laid-off in their job search.
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Group of workers Number of observations
Female production workers 21,700,000
Male production workers 21,900,000
Female non production workers 2,468,865




Non production workers 8,435,635
Source: Indonesia Industry Survey (SI)
Table 14 Descriptive statistics
Meaning Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Log of total paid employment 290334 4.208 1.192 0 9.5490
Log of total paid production employment 290248 4.020 1.191 0 9.3923
Log of total paid non-production employment 246081 2.279 1.455 0 8.5553
Log of real minimum wage 290339 4.485 0.264 3.689 5.1684
Log of firm age 289654 2.354 0.854 0 4.6052
Log of percentage exported 207256 10.725 28.488 0 100
Percentage owned by foreigners 290339 5.652 21.227 0 100
Percentage owned by government 290339 2.798 15.995 0 100
Log of real value added per worker 289806 8.103 1.3196 -3.9571 16.518
Log of real average wage per production worker 290149 7.059 0.857 -2.255 15.239
Log of real average wage per non-production worker 238725 7.631 1.075 -6.688 16.194
Table 15 Employment effects of minimum wages on production workers in large firms by
educational category
Dependent variable: Log (Employment of production workers)
Primary Jr. Sr. High High School Bachelor
Log (Min. Wage) -0.001 0.023 -0.184 -0.114
-(0.138) -(0.067) -(0.147) -(0.143)
Log (Firm Age) 0.139** 0.165*** -0.027 -0.085
-(0.062) -(0.029) -(0.070) -(0.065)
Foreign Share 0.000 0.00152*** 0.001 0.00179*
-(0.001) (0.000) -(0.001) -(0.001)
Export Share 0.000 0.000587*** 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) -(0.001) -(0.001)
Govt. Share 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
-(0.001) -(0.001) -(0.001) -(0.001)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firms 16,360 19,036 3592 3087
Observations 35,634 40,865 5159 4502
*significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 10% level
Table 16 Employment effects of minimum wages on non-production workers in large firms by
educational category
Dependent variable: Log (Employment of non-production workers)
Primary Jr. Sr. High High School Bachelor
Log (Min. Wage) 0.511* -0.196*** -0.328*** 0.122
-(0.268) -(0.061) -(0.107) -(0.095)
Log (Firm Age) 0.195* 0.188*** 0.0872* -0.0208
-(0.117) -(0.028) -(0.045) -(0.041)
Foreign Share 0.00109 0.000228 0.000892 0.00198***
-(0.001) (0.000) -(0.001) -(0.001)
Export Share -0.00128** 0.00111*** 0.0004 0.00105***
-(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Govt. Share 0.0007 0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0006
-(0.001) -(0.001) -(0.001) -(0.001)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Firms 3839 7128 5891 6073
Observations 7914 17,820 13,337 14,039
*significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 10% level
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Firm level data: The explanatory variable of interest is log of real minimum wage
(Minimum wage). Other control variables are log of firm’s age (Firm age), percentage
owned by foreigners (Foreign), percentage of output exported (Export), percentage
owned by local and central government (Government), and log of real value added per
worker (Value Added).
Export: percentage of a firm’s output that is exported.
Foreign: percentage of firms owned by foreigners.
Government: percentage of firms owned by local or central government.
Value added: log of real value added per worker. This is calculated by taking value
added per worker divided by the provincial CPI obtained from the BPS.
Minimum wages: Minimum wages were obtained from BPS as monthly provincial
minimum wages (or averages where there is within-province variation across districts)
for each year. Real minimum wages are obtained by deflating provincial minimum
wages by the provincial CPI. We are grateful to Bob Rijkers and Mary Hallward-
Driemeier and David Newhouse for making the data available to us.
Wages (firm level averages): following Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2010), wages are de-
fined as the average wages for production and non-production workers, constructed as
the total wage bill for either group divided by the number of workers of either respect-
ive group. The total wage bill for production and non-production workers is defined as
the sum of cash wages and in-kind benefits.
Production workers: Production workers, defined by Indonesia industry survey,
as “workers who work directly in the production process, or activities connected
with the production process, from the time materials enter the factory until the
final products are sent out of the factory, for example, foreman supervising the
production process, driver of a forklift in the factory, workers of working in the
processing of goods etc.”.
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1Production workers, defined by Indonesia industry survey, as “workers who work
directly in the production process, or activities connected with the production process,
from the time materials enter the factory until the final products are sent out of the
factory, for example, foreman supervising the production process, driver of a forklift in
the factory, workers of working in the processing of goods etc.”.
2See Neumark and Wascher (2008) for a comprehensive overview.
3An exception is Indonesia Jobs Report (2010) where they analyze employment using
individual level data, rather than provincial aggregates in province fixed effects regres-
sions. They also find that minimum wages tend to decrease industrial and formal sector
employment.
4Similar evidence is also found for Indonesia, see Indonesia Jobs report, by the World
Bank 2010.
5Law on Manpower Affairs 2003 articles 88 and 89. Regulation regarding implemen-
tation and component of achievement scale on adequate living needs (ALN) articles1
and 3. cited in ILO (2011a).
6Please see the Appendix for the sources of minimum wage data.
7It is worth noting that the minimum wage in China has been increasing rapidly in
recent years and the ratio may be the same or higher than Indonesia in 2012.
8The SI data track establishments, rather than firms. A recent PBS study has sug-
gested that less than 5% of establishments in the Manufacturing Census are owned by a
multi-establishment firm (see Hallward-Driemeier et al., 2010 for a discussion). For this
reason, we will use the terms “firms” and “plants” interchangeably throughout the
paper.
9Since we utilize panel data with firm fixed effects, we drop firms that appear only
once during the sampled period.
10Domestic firms are defined as those that have 10% or less owned by foreigners.
11Labor-intensive manufacturing firms are defined as firms in textiles, leather, foot-
wear, wood products and furniture.
12Some provinces were split during the sample period. We allow minimum wages to
differ across the split provinces.
13The sample size is smaller when additional regressors are added as these variables
have missing values for several years.
14Figure 8 is estimated using a kernel density method on a weighted sample. The ver-
tical line represents an average of all sub-national minimum wage lines (logged) in the
country. There are about 28 different lines, and these range from as low as 12.87 in
East Java to as high as 13.62 in West Irian Jaya, Aceh and Jakarta.
15Data on education of the workforce is available only in four years: 1995, 1996, 1997
and 2006.
16Evidence from around the world shows that firms factor in costs associated with
benefits they provide women (e.g. maternity and family leave, maternity insurance
coverage). They also factor costs for replacing women during longer work absences
(Ruhm, 1998).
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